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Abstract 
 
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) result in 86% of European deaths and 77% of 
the European disease burden.3 The distribution of NCDs is not equal: the lower 
somebody’s socio-economic position, the worse his(her) health will be and the lower 
their expectancy. Following increasingly powerful calls, the European Union (EU) has 
given the prevention of NCDs and the reduction of health inequalities greater 
thought. 
 
This paper assesses, from a behavioural research perspective, interventions 
introduced by EU consumer law to prevent NCDs. After discussing the ubiquity of 
European health inequalities, it reviews the determinants of these inequalities and 
demonstrates that these are in fact inequities which demand regulatory action. The 
paper then broadly examines the range of interventions the EU legislature has 
introduced – primarily information regulation – in order to reduce NCDs and why 
these have failed to both prevent NCDs and reduce health inequalities. 
 
The paper then analyses the controversial debate on the extent to which behavioural 
research should play as a core consideration in consumer policy. The paper 
concludes that regulating consumer information is a useful tool for NCD prevention, 
but that it requires integrating of greater insights from the way consumers actually 
behave if it is to reduce health inequalities. Moreover, there are limitations to policies 
which regulate information, and therefore the EU should make more use of other 
tools in its regulatory toolbox. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The global burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) is staggering. NCDs 
account for 36 million deaths, or 63% of global mortality.4 The regional impact of 
NCDs is equally overwhelming: NCDs result in 86% of European deaths and 77% of 
the European disease burden.5 
 
The Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable 
Diseases,6 adopted in 2011 by the UN General Assembly, confirms that the threat 
and burden of NCDs represent one of the major challenges for development in the 
twenty-first century. In reaffirming the right of everyone to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, it recognises the urgent need for greater 
prevention and control. The Declaration calls on Member States to deliver multi-
sector, multi-level, population-wide, evidence-based, health-in-all-policy action, which 
is not only affordable but also cost-effective. Particularly, the Declaration calls on 
Member States to create health-promoting environments which empower people to 
make healthy choices and lead healthy lives. It confirms that the most prominent 
NCDs – namely cancers, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases, and 
obesity – are linked inextricably with the conditions in which people live and their 
lifestyles and behaviours.7 These diseases are largely preventable, particularly 
through a reduction in exposure to the modifiable risk factors of unhealthy diets, 
excessive consumption of alcohol, tobacco use, and a lack of physical activity.  
 
The distribution of these NCDs is far from equal amongst different groups of the 
population: there is a strong socioeconomic gradient between the health status of the 
lower and higher socioeconomic groups. The lower somebody’s socioeconomic 
position (‘SEP’) is, the worse his or her health is likely to be. People from lower SEP 
groups live shorter lives than people from higher SEP groups; and live more of their 
shorter lives with disease. These inequalities in health are linked inextricably with, 
again, the conditions in which people live and their behaviours. These social 
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determinants of health, and the health inequalities they result in, are in fact inequities 
which demand action as a matter of social justice. 
 
Following increasingly powerful calls to tackle the determinants of NCDs,8 the 
European Union (EU) has given the prevention of NCDs and the reduction of health 
inequalities greater thought.9 Its actions on tackling the major modifiable risk factors 
of unhealthy diets, tobacco use and excessive alcohol consumption have ranged 
from soft, non-binding measures in the case of alcohol, to stronger measures in the 
case of tobacco, with nutrition falling somewhere in-between.10 
 
Where the EU has taken legislative action, with the exception of product safety, this 
has centred primarily on trying to influence consumers towards healthier behaviours 
through regulating the information environment in which consumer live, work and 
play. These policies are not only insufficiently effective, but they have also failed to 
reduce the inequalities in health which remain pervasive throughout the European 
populations. 
 
This paper assesses, from a behavioural research perspective,11 interventions 
introduced by EU consumer law to prevent NCDs. After discussing the ubiquity of 
European health inequalities, it reviews the determinants of these inequalities and 
demonstrates that these are in fact inequities which demand regulatory action. The 
paper then broadly examines the range of interventions the EU legislature has 
introduced in order to reduce NCDs and why these have failed to both prevent NCDs 
and reduce health inequalities. This focusses on the EU’s heavy reliance on 
regulating the consumer information environment. It demonstrates that the measures 
the EU has introduced in its consumer policy are not meaningful enough to prevent 
NCDs and reduce health inequalities – in fact, they are more likely to increase health 
inequalities because they are more ineffective for members of lower SEP groups. 
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With this in mind, the paper then analyses the controversial debate on the extent to 
which behavioural research should play as a core consideration in consumer policy. 
The paper concludes that consumer information is a useful tool for NCD prevention, 
but that it requires integrating of greater insights from the way consumers actually 
behave if it is to reduce health inequalities. Moreover, there are limitations to policies 
which regulate information, and therefore the EU should make more use of other 
tools in its regulatory toolbox. 
 
II. Inequalities and the social determinants of health 
 
While the concept of health inequalities is not a new one, these inequalities were 
‘discovered’ in the 19th century mainly as a result of the availability of new 
epidemiological data. Since then, the great need to eradicate health inequalities has 
featured at the highest global levels. Already in 1978, the Alma-Ata Declaration 
acknowledged that: 
 
The existing gross inequality in the health status of the people particularly 
between developed and developing countries as well as within countries is 
politically, socially and economically unacceptable and is, therefore, of 
common concern to all countries.12 
 
Though these issues have received increasing attention with the turn of the century,13 
it remains the case that inequalities in health continue to be pervasive. Even in 
countries which have taken a historic lead in investigating health inequalities, such as 
the UK, little has been achieved to successfully eradicate such inequalities.14 
 
After defining health inequalities, this section discusses the ubiquity of European 
health inequalities, and reviews the determinants of these. It then demonstrates that 
these inequalities are in fact inequities which demand regulatory action. 
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 A. Health inequalities and health inequities 
 
The phrase ‘health inequality’ is the ‘generic term used to designate differences, 
variations, and disparities in the health achievements of individuals and groups’.15 
 
A simple example of a health inequality is that the life expectancy at birth of a female 
born in the highest scoring Member State of the EU is almost eight years higher than 
in the lowest scoring Member State. Similarly, the life expectancy at birth of a male 
born in the highest scoring Member State of the EU is almost 12 years higher than in 
the lowest scoring Member State.16 
 
When health inequalities are ‘systematic, socially produced (and therefore 
modifiable) and unfair’,17 they are also said to be health inequities. 
 
In the examples above, the health inequalities between the populations from the 
highest scoring and lowest scoring Member States, in the case of both females and 
males, are also inequities. There are also inequalities between males and females, 
but these are not necessarily inequities as women tend to live longer than men for 
non-social, non-modifiable reasons.18 
 
Differentiating inequalities from inequities is important for a number of reasons. 
Systematic and non-systematic inequalities are distinguished in order to exclude 
random differences, by only including those differences which show a consistent 
distribution across the population. By only considering those inequalities which are 
socially produced, biological causes which are fixed and unavoidable can be 
excluded, not least because these are not amenable to modification.19 Through only 
considering those differences which are unfair, that is to say those ‘health inequalities 
that are preventable by reasonable means’,20 an approach can be taken which 
reflects real-world limitations. 
 
While inequalities may be a factual statement, and inequities a normative statement 
which demands regulatory action as a matter of social justice, this distinction is not 
always used. The literature uses the terms interchangeably. Following this trend, the 
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remainder of this paper uses the phrase ‘health inequalities’ as synonymous with the 
more accurate ‘health inequities’. 
 
 B. Health inequalities in the EU 
 
Health inequalities in the EU are alarming, and have been widely and strongly 
documented both within and between Member States.21 For instance, the level of 
poor health and chronic illness is on average twice as high in the bottom income 
quintile when compared with the highest quintile.22 
 
The significant differences in mortality between Member States is stark. In four 
Member States, predominantly in Eastern Europe, the age-standardised mortality 
rate for males in 2010 exceeded 1,200 per 100,000. In 17 Member States, it was less 
than 800. In 2010, at birth females in France or Spain could have expected to live on 
average 10% longer than females in Bulgaria, a difference of 7.9 years. Estimates 
from 2010 on morbidity also reveal that males in the EU could expect to live 61.7 
years in good health - this ranged from 52 years in Slovakia to 72 years in Sweden.23 
 
Health inequalities within the borders of Member States are equally alarming.24 For 
instance, in England, those living in the poorest areas will on average die seven 
years earlier than those living in the richest areas, and will live 17 years more with 
disability. Therefore, those people living in poorer neighbourhoods die earlier and 
spend more of their shorter life living with disability.25 
 
 C. Determinants of health inequalities 
 
Health inequalities exist on a strong gradient with SEP. SEP here is shorthand for the 
social hierarchy or ranking of individuals or groups based on sociological and 
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economic goods.26 This definition is not universally agreed, but this is of little 
consequences to the policy arguments, as ‘[n]o matter how it is defined, it appears 
that [SEP], as it relates to health status/healthcare, is an attempt to capture an 
individual's or group's access to the basic resources required to achieve and maintain 
good health.’27 
 
While certain measures of SEP, or proxies of these measures, are generally agreed 
upon, such as education and wealth; other measures, such as race or sex, are less 
agreeable.28 Following the World Health Organization’s lead for a broad 
understanding of the social determinants of health, SEP is perhaps better 
conceptualised as ‘differential access (reali[s]ed and potential) to desired 
resources’.29 In defining these social determinants of health, the WHO Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health states: 
 
The poor health of the poor, the social gradient in health within countries, and 
the marked health inequities between countries are caused by the unequal 
distribution of power, income, goods, and services, globally and nationally, the 
consequent unfairness in the immediate, visible circumstances of peoples [sic] 
lives – their access to health care, schools, and education, their conditions of 
work and leisure, their homes, communities, towns, or cities – and their 
chances of leading a flourishing life…Together, the structural determinants 
and conditions of daily life constitute the social determinants of health and are 
responsible for a major part of health inequities between and within 
countries.30 
 
In order to understand why SEP is correlated with health status, it is first necessary 
to begin with the diseases which affect those in lower SEP groups more than those in 
higher SEP groups. 
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It is well known that the biggest killers and the biggest sources of disease burden in 
Europe, and indeed globally, are NCDs. These are not only more prevalent in people 
from lower SEP groups, but they also cause more deaths in lower SEP groups. This 
pattern is seen for all four major groups of NCDs: cancers,31 cardiovascular 
diseases,32 chronic respiratory diseases33 and obesity.34 This higher mortality and 
morbidity in lower SEP groups can be said to be the cause of health inequalities. 
 
The causes of these causes are also well documented. Through disaggregated data, 
it is known that members of lower SEP groups live more with the major unhealthy risk 
factors:  unhealthy diets,35 tobacco use36 and excessive consumption of alcohol.37 
 
Members of lower SEP groups live more with the risk factors which cause NCDs, and 
in turn more with NCDs. However, this evidence demonstrates correlation, but not 
causation.38 As Josiane Bonnefoy et al identify: 
 
‘With respect to the social determinants of health, we are able to identify some 
of the necessary and the sufficient conditions involved in causation but their 
nature, under what circumstances, and how they operate from the social to the 
biological is not always very clear. The core candidates can be listed relatively 
easily because the extant literature has explored them at length’.39 
 
Due to complex and multifactorial nature of NCDs, there is no single theory which 
accounts for health inequalities and their causal link with SEP. Nevertheless, the 
most prominent approaches which have sought to capture causality include the 
                                            
 
31
 See JP Mackenbach, ‘Health Inequalities: Europe in Profile’ (2006), 26-27 & 15-16; Vanessa Gordon-Dseagu, 
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35
 See ‘Social and economic inequalities in diet and physical activity’ (Public Health England 2013); 
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36
 See R Hiscock et al, ‘Socioeconomic status and smoking: a review’ (2012) 107 Annals of the New York 
Academy of Research 1248. 
37
 See K Bloomfield et al, ‘Social inequalities in alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems in the study 
countries of the EU concerted action ‘gender, culture and alcohol problems: a multi-national study’ 41(1) Alcohol 
& Alcoholism (2006) i26. 
38
 H Graham, ‘Introduction: the challenge of health inequalities’ in H Graham (ed), Understanding Health 
Inequalities (2nd edn, Open University Press 2009), 13; M Shaw, D Dorling, D Gordon, G Davey Smith, The 
Widening Gap: Health Inequities and Policy in Britain (Policy Press 1999). 
39
 J Bonnefoy et al, ‘Constructing the evidence base on the social determinants of health: A guide’ (NICE 2007), 
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material/structural, psychosocial and behavioural/cultural models, with the health 
selection and artefact theories having been largely discredited. These approaches 
have been explored elsewhere.40 
 
As EU consumer law places the burden of making healthy decisions on the 
consumer, through the concept of ‘consumer empowerment’,41 the 
behavioural/cultural model is particularly relevant. This approach hypothesises that 
SEP emphasises differences in behaviours that are either beneficial or detrimental to 
health. It is thought that certain groups of the population have ‘cultures’42 which are 
associated with unhealthy risk factors, and this is the cause of health inequalities. 
The idea of behaviours associated with cultures cannot be denied. However, this 
approach presents an incomplete picture – it does not explain why the behaviour of 
members of lower SEP groups follows this social patterning.43 Therefore, even this 
approach is of limited use in explaining the underlying determinants  
 
In the absence of a non-contentious, complete theory on social patterning of 
behavioural risk factors, policy-makers can focus on the causal pathway of health 
inequalities. Hilary Graham identifies that inequalities in the social/material structure 
of society lead to inequalities in the consumer’s socioeconomic position. This leads to 
inequalities in the consumer’s environment, which causes inequalities in the 
consumer’s behaviour and psychology. These behaviours lead to disease 
differentials.44 Following this pathway, it becomes clear that interventions designed to 
change consumer behaviour in order to reduce health inequalities are best directed 
at improving the consumer’s environment, the social/material structure of society, or 
both. 
 
III. Policy failures 
 
The European Commission acknowledges that health inequalities between 
advantaged and disadvantaged citizens are inconsistent with the EU’s aspirations of 
equality of opportunity, protection of human rights, social and economic cohesion, 
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34(1) Sociology of Health & Illness 130. 
41
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avoidance of discrimination, and solidarity.45 Together with Member States, it has 
therefore engaged in various responses, including strategic communications, policy 
strategies, structured activities, monitoring and evaluation, committee work, funding, 
and research.46 
 
When used, these tools have been successful in many ways, such as reducing some 
specific determinants of NCDs,47 but despite these sentiments, commitments and 
actions, little has been successfully achieved to reduce health inequalities. For 
instance, while the rates of lung cancers due to smoking have been reducing in all 
SEP groups, the likelihood of unskilled workers developing the diseases in the 1970s 
was approximately three times higher than the professional classes, but in the 1990s 
this increased to more than five times.48 
 
This does not imply that these policies and interventions have been ineffective - for 
instance, they may have reduced the increase in health gaps which would have 
otherwise occurred.49 More accurately, it reflects the fact that NCD causation is 
complex, and its prevention complicated. Indeed, there is no magic bullet to halt and 
reverse this epidemic. It therefore requires an analysis of why these have not been 
as successful as one would hope. This has been highlighted most rightly by Margaret 
Chan, WHO Director-General, who notes that ‘[h]ealth inequities exist because the 
wrong policies are in place.’50 
 
There are four broad policy options available to tackle health inequalities. Firstly, and 
most importantly, to reduce inequalities in the distribution of socioeconomic factors 
and structural determinants. Secondly, to tackle specific or intermediary determinants 
which mediate the effect of SEP on health, such as smoking. Thirdly, to tackle the 
consequences of lower health status on SEP. Fourthly, when people do become ill, 
to provide those in lower SEP groups healthcare which is more suited to their 
needs.51 While such action should benefit all in society universally, it should be at a 
scale and intensity that is proportionate to the level of disadvantage – what is termed 
proportionate universalism.52 These actions require a comprehensive, multi-level, 
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 See Health Inequalities in the EU: Final Report of a Consortium (European Commission Directorate-General for 
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 ‘Health Inequalities in the EU: Final Report of a Consortium’ (European Commission Directorate-General for 
Health and Consumers 2013), 87. 
47
 P Mladovsky et al, ‘Health in the European Union: Trends and Analysis’ (European Observatory on Health 
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 K Richardson, ‘Smoking, Low Income and Health Inequalities: Thematic Discussion Document’ (Action on 
Smoking and Health and the Health Development Agency 2001). 
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 It is often rather difficult to determine which policies have had a positive effect on the reduction of disease 
because of epidemiological limitations, such as an ability to remove confounding factors from population data. 
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 WHO World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health, 2011. 
51
 ‘A conceptual framework for action on the social determinants of health’ (World Health Organization 2010). 
52
 ‘Fair Society, Healthy Lives: Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England’ (The Marmot Review 2010), 16. 
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multi-sector, health-in-all policies approach with the backing of political will.53 They 
should also include legal interventions. 
 
 A. Legal interventions to reduce NCDs and health inequalities 
 
Law provides significant and diverse opportunities for preventing NCDs. Of its many 
advantages, some of the more notable ones include its universal application to all 
actors, its binding nature and ability to be enforced with consequences, its 
democratic process, its susceptibility to legitimate challenge before the courts, and its 
ability to change societal norms.54 It is therefore not surprising that the WHO Global 
Action Plan refers specifically to law as a tool for the prevention and control of 
NCDs.55 
 
In developing law and legal instruments, EU policy-makers have a number of tools at 
their disposal. These include disclosure requirements, information regulation 
schemes, marketing suppression, measures affecting product availability, economic 
instruments, fundamental rights approaches, performance-based regulation, self-
regulation, supportive policies such as education campaigns, and civil liability 
schemes.56 
 
This is not to say that law is a panacea in NCD prevention. Law does have limits, not 
least that the regulatory process can be slow and resource-intensive. Indeed, in 
addition to being a source of opportunities, law is also a source of constraints, such 
as with the constitutional limits in which the EU operates. Moreover, ‘the legality, 
design, legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of several regulatory interventions 
intended to promote healthier behaviours remain highly contested’.57 It is only 
through understanding these constraints, will policy-makers be able to maximise 
opportunities.58 
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Alemanno and A Garde (eds), Regulating Lifestyle Risks: The EU, Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets 
(Cambridge University Press 2014), 2. 
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 A Alemanno and A Garde, ‘Regulating Lifestyles in Europe: How to Prevent and Control Non-Communicable 
Diseases Associated with Tobacco, Alcohol and Unhealthy Diets?’ (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 
2013), 12. 
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The question is not so much whether the law can play an important role in promoting 
healthier behaviours – it clearly does. Rather, the question is how the law can be 
designed to support effective NCD prevention and control policies and withstand 
legal challenges.59 
 
 B. The limitations of EU consumer policy 
 
Notwithstanding that multiple tools in the regulatory mix need to be employed to 
tackle the NCD epidemic, the overwhelming majority of legislative measures have 
been introduced under the EU’s consumer protection competence.60,61 These have 
been aimed at reducing NCDs generally, and have targeted specific or intermediary 
determinants. If Hilary Graham’s causal pathway above is recalled, this revolves 
around changing the environment so that it is conducive to healthier behaviours. 
Such measures have focussed on the information environment through, for instance, 
food labelling requirements, tobacco warnings and prohibitions against misleading 
marketing.62 
 
Regulating information as a tool of consumer protection expanded significantly 
following the 1960s, with the adoption of a ‘Preliminary Programme of the European 
Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy’ and its 
explicit acknowledgment that consumers have the right to information.63 This has 
remained at the core of the EU’s consumer protection agenda.64 
 
The EU’s legal response to NCD prevention, and the protection of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, has also focussed heavily on the consumer information 
paradigm.65 This envisages that consumers are provided with sufficient and accurate 
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information so that they become well-informed, and therefore make rational decisions 
which protect their health.66 
 
Information disclosures as a tool for NCD prevention enjoys many advantages, which 
can be categorised into economic and equitable,67 as well as pragmatic, rationales. 
Briefly said, economic efficiency can result from information disclosures because 
they correct informational asymmetries which favour industry.68 Thus, the typical 
policy responses focus on providing information to consumers; and, where such 
information is unlikely to be processed and acted upon, to regulate the substance of 
transactions.69 The equity rationale asserts that consumers have the right to 
information;70 and consumers’ desire to be informed about products71 should be 
fulfilled. However, in addition to there being no consensus on what it means to be 
sufficiently informed,72 fundamental rights arguments have not yet been 
systematically utilised by the public health community.73 The political pragmatism 
rationale also favours information, as disclosures are often easier to implement than 
‘command and conquer’ rules. Also, by not reducing choice, consumer autonomy can 
be preserved, which in turn ameliorates allegations of paternalism and its pejorative 
conceptualisation through the ‘nanny state’.74 
 
If it is accepted that the regulation of information leads to consumers being 
empowered, and thereby guides them to healthier choices, information schemes 
would be consistent with NCD prevention. However, the current information paradigm 
is not consonant with achieving these aspirations. 
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This is because law, in importing the concept from neoclassical economics, takes as 
an axiom rational consumers who make consumption decisions which best match 
their true needs when armed with sufficient and accurate information. Rational 
consumers are said to maximise ‘their utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
markets’.75 Characterised as homo economicus, this consumer is ‘perfectly informed, 
forward-looking, invariant in his preferences, and whose decisions are 
unencumbered by irrelevant contextual influences’. This is the foundation on which 
consumer laws and policies have been adopted. 
 
The thrust of this paper is that a substantial source of the failure to reduce NCDs and 
health inequalities arises from EU consumer law and policy not taking sufficient 
account of how consumers, especially those from lower SEP groups, actually 
behave. 
 
As one of the main tasks of law, consciously or unconsciously, is to change 
behaviour, its ability to implement rules to effect such changes depends on the 
accuracy of the models of behaviour on which it is based. These models should not 
only foresee the response of consumers, but also include insights into why 
consumers are predicted to act in such ways.76 
 
The difficulty, therefore, of the rational consumer model centres on its lack of 
predictive power and the implausibility of its predictions. Behavioural research – an 
umbrella term which encompasses fields including behavioural economics, 
psychology, sociology, management, consumer decision making, and many others – 
has helped identified three key reasons for this. 
 
Firstly, the information paradigm promoted by the EU presupposes that consumers 
are given good quality, sufficient information which is accurate and not misleading.77 
The EU therefore takes responsibility for ensuring that the consumer has available 
the necessary, valuable information. The difficulty with this is that information 
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provided is not always sufficient and of good quality, and not always accurate and not 
misleading.78 There is therefore a disparity between the behaviour of the notional 
consumer and the real-world consumer. 
 
Secondly, behavioural economics has brought to the fore the identification of the two 
sets of systems of thought, which can be considered endogenous limitations.79 
System 1 is the automatic system: it is uncontrolled, effortless, emotional, 
unconscious and fast, and has great capacity but engages superficially. System 2 is 
the reflective system: it is controlled, effortful, deductive, self-aware and slow, and 
has limited capacity but engages deeply.80 This research reveals that consumers 
rarely act completely rationally – what is often termed ‘bounded rationality’81 – not 
least because consumers are subject to heuristics and biases. Despite this, the 
behaviour change model on which much of law82 – including consumer law83 – is 
grounded takes as its base a strong vision of System 2, and largely discounts the 
role of System 1.  
 
Thirdly, rationality is not always determinant of consumer decisions, as consumer 
behaviour is multifaceted.84 In particular, there are exogenous factors which can 
impact on consumers following through with healthy purchasing decisions. For 
instance, a consumer may make a perfectly rational decision to purchase and 
consume more fruit and vegetables, but may not have local access to a retailer who 
supplies these products, or may not have sufficient income to purchase healthier 
products which are often more expensive than less healthy products.85 
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The totality of this behavioural research tells us that consumers (i) do not like 
change; (ii) are influenced by others; (iii) are not inherently selfish; (iv) have egos; (v) 
live in the here and now; (vi) have limited cognitive capacity; (vii) are influenced be 
their environment; (viii) makes choices relatively; and (ix) have values which are 
personal.86 
 
These behavioural insights apply at all stages of the purchasing process. Therefore, 
in order for information to influence behavioural choices positively, consumer 
decision theories reveal that consumer must (i) be exposed to the information and (ii) 
perceive it. They must then (iii) understand the information and (iv) draw an inference 
of the healthiness of product. Then (v) integrate this with other information. This will 
influence the (vi) evaluation of the product, and eventually the (vii) purchase 
decision.87  
 
The corollary of the application of behavioural insights to the purchasing process is to 
reveal that a failure to sufficiently incorporate the findings of behavioural research 
into consumer policy leads to the development of rules which may not be effective in 
NCD prevention.88 This is not to say, however, that consumer law has not taken any 
account of behavioural research. This is far from true.89 Instead, it is to say that, 
despite some limited behavioural insights, the rational consumer model in consumer 
law still lacks sufficient predictive power and maintains implausible predictions. 
 
 C. Behavioural insights in consumer law 
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EU consumer law does take behavioural considerations into account when 
developing new legislation.90 However, when behavioural research is taken into 
account, two limitations remain. Either (i) the standard against which consumer 
behaviour is assessed is particularly high; or (ii) the expectation of consumer 
behaviour is improbable. 
 
For limitations of space, this section discusses two examples from recent consumer 
protection legislative acts which have, at least in part, the objective of NCD 
prevention. The first is the case of the Food Claims Regulation91 which, through its 
average consumer benchmark, assesses consumer behaviour against an 
exceptionally high standard. The second is the revised Tobacco Products Directive92 
which, through its provisions on warnings, places an improbable expectation on 
consumer behaviour. 
 
 (a) Food Claims Regulation 
 
Notwithstanding the EU’s early awareness of the negative effects of unhealthy diets, 
and the importance of food labelling in informing and educating consumers,93 it is 
only in recent years that the EU has taken a more active, joined-up approach to food 
labelling which fuses considerations of economic interests with that of health.94 What 
has resulted is the current regulatory system governing food information which aims 
for ‘the protection of the interests of consumers’ through enabling ‘consumers to 
make informed choices in relation to the foods they consume’.95  
 
Article 5(2) of the Food Claims Regulation provides that health and nutrition claims96 
are only permitted if ‘the average consumer can be expected to understand the 
beneficial effects as expressed in the claim.’97 This is qualified by the Preamble 
which states that in determining whether consumers are likely to be misled, in line 
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with general EU consumer law,98 a benchmark is taken of the average consumer who 
is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect taking into 
account social, cultural and linguistic factors.99,100 
 
The notion of the average consumer has developed over a substantial body of case 
law.101 This asserts that the average consumer is an active player in the market who 
reads information102 but perhaps will pay less attention to common products. 103 The 
average consumer will have background knowledge.104 The average consumer will 
also be critical towards information, and not take information literally.105 The average 
consumer will not be misled easily if sufficient information is available.106  
 
The reality is that consumers do not always read food information,107 will not always 
have background knowledge,108 will not always be critical towards information,109 and 
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therefore will often be misled.110 Moreover, although the Court does not prohibit 
research polls and expert opinions, which may provide statistical or qualitative insight 
into consumer behaviour, it stresses the issue being one for judicial assessment.111  
 
The benchmark is ‘an attempt to navigate a course between the rich diversity of 
actual consumer behaviour and the need for an operational regulatory benchmark.’112 
However, in aiming for a workable pan-European standard,113 and adopting a 
measure of maximum harmonisation, there remains little room to take into account 
the differences which exist between consumers.114  
 
The Regulation seeks to mitigate these difficulties by only permitting ‘nutrition claims’ 
which appear on a closed list in the Annex to the Regulation. As regards ‘health 
claims’, the Regulation provides that these ‘should only be authorised…after a 
scientific assessment of the highest possible standard.’115 The European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), who is tasked with delivering opinions on health claims, shall ‘give 
advice on whether the proposed wording of the health claim is understandable and 
meaningful to the average consumer’116 and take this understanding into account 
when assessing application for authorisation of claims.117 In its initial assessment of 
claims, which must also follow the average consumer test laid down by the CJEU, 
EFSA rejected approximately 80% of claims submitted to it. This has certainly helped 
wipe out a great number of misleading statement. However, the known processes of 
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EFSA,118 as well as its implementing rules,119 do not make explicit reference to 
consumer understanding. Indeed, the Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and 
Allergies at EFSA, which deals with substantiation of food claims, does not have 
members who specialise in matters of consumer understanding.120 It therefore 
remains the case that while the EU has made much progress, it has not gone far 
enough. 
 
Indeed, the original proposed Food Claims Regulation included a provision which 
would have prohibited food claims if the food product did not meet a certain 
nutritional profile. As the preamble correctly notes: ‘The application of nutrient profiles 
as a criterion would aim to avoid a situation where nutrition or health claims mask the 
overall nutritional status of a food product, which could mislead consumers when 
trying to make healthy choices in the context of a balanced diet.’121 This, however, 
transpired to be ‘one of the most debated articles’ in the proposed Regulation.122 The 
final text of the Regulation was diluted in two ways. Firstly, the restrictions are less 
restrictive than originally proposed. Secondly, nutrient profiling was not detailed in the 
text. Instead, the Commission was required to establish such a system. Reaching 
consensus on this has proved so difficult123 that no profile has been adopted by the 
Commission.124 The deadline expired in January 2009.125 
 
 (b) Tobacco Products Directive 
 
The revised Tobacco Products Directive (TPD2) takes into account behavioural 
research most notably by requiring larger graphical warnings;126 and removing the 
tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide (TNC) declaration. The preamble specifically 
notes this behavioural basis: 
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‘The labelling provisions should also be adapted to new scientific evidence. 
For example, the indication of the emission levels for tar, nicotine and carbon 
monoxide on unit packets of cigarettes has proven to be misleading as it leads 
consumers to believe that certain cigarettes are less harmful than others. 
Evidence also suggests that large combined health warnings comprised of a 
text warning and a corresponding colour photograph are more effective than 
warnings consisting only of text. As a consequence, combined health 
warnings should become mandatory throughout the Union and cover 
significant and visible parts of the surface of unit packets. Minimum 
dimensions should be set for all health warnings to ensure their visibility and 
effectiveness.’127 
 
The advantages of warnings are well known. They educate consumers as to health 
risks, increase motivation to quit, undermine brand value, and can therefore help 
reduce smoking rates. Although there is ‘broad consensus that these warnings are 
legitimate and helpful’128 tobacco warnings required by the first Tobacco Products 
Directive129 proved not be in line with best evidence.130 ‘There is a genuine difference 
between information provision and information impact’.131 Consumers often do not 
see or notice warnings, do not understand warnings, and may also ignore warnings 
even if they are visible and comprehensible.132 
 
Therefore, following the binding commitments the EU and its Member Stats have 
signed up to through the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,133 
improvements followed with TPD2. These included increased size, more visible 
placement, combined warnings which include both text and graphics, and better 
rotation of warnings.134 However, the behavioural limitations of warnings persist135 
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even for well-designed warnings.136 It is therefore not surprising that the revised 
information scheme, on its own, will contribute to an unambitious estimated 1-1.5% 
reduction in smoking over the first five years of the Directive.137 
 
With the limited effectiveness of tobacco warnings, it is suggested that standardised, 
sometimes known as plain or generic, packaging would be a more useful tool. This 
would maintain warnings but otherwise enforce ‘drab, purposefully unattractive 
packaging, devoid of branding (other than name) or promotional information.138 
Through reducing the appeal of the products, increasing the effectiveness of health 
warnings and reducing the ability of packaging to mislead consumers about the 
harmful effects of tobacco, such packaging would discourage adults and children 
from taking up smoking, encourage people to give up and discourage relapses.139 
 
The Commission’s impact assessment, which was based on extensive evidence, 
made clear that standardised packaging would be the most effective policy: it would 
strengthen the internal market, improve equality, and have the most positive 
implications for consumer health.140 Although the Commission acknowledged that 
standardised packaging was ‘expected to achieve the policy objectives even more 
effectively’ it did not recommend this ‘given the current lack of real life experience, 
pending legal disputes regarding the plain packaging and serious concerns 
expressed by some stakeholders’.141 In this context it is useful to note that the 
adoption of TPD2 was mired in controversy, delay and unprecedented industry 
lobby142 with ‘no previous public consultation launched by the European Commission 
[having] ever registered such significant participation’. During the public consultation 
on the revision, the most controversial element proved to be the provision of 
consumer information.143 
 
 D. Specific impacts on lower SEP groups 
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The reduced effectiveness of information regulation in NCD prevention, through the 
omission of sufficient insight from behavioural research, is exaggerated in members 
of lower SEP groups. In other words, interventions benefit lower SEP groups much 
less than higher SEP groups. Compounded with the fact that some interventions may 
have limited impact anyway, this becomes an appreciable hindrance to improving the 
health of members of lower SEP groups. Policies, in effect, perpetuate health 
inequalities. 
 
This could be for a number of reasons, but there is a large dearth in the literature 
highlighting the behavioural research implications on health inequalities. As there has 
been no systematic attempt to explain why the omission of behavioural insights is 
more detrimental to lower SEP groups, this paper seeks to fill this gap. From the 
broader literature, three reasons can be inferred.  
 
The first reason relates to the endogenous limitation of consumers. This is that 
consumers from lower SEP groups are subject to greater limitations of both Systems 
1 and 2 – their rationality is ‘more bounded’. For instance, poverty causes 
psychological consequences, including stress and negative affective states, which 
lead to short-sighted and risk-averse decision-making, which reinforce habitual 
behaviours more strongly.144 
 
The second reason relates to the interaction between the consumer’s endogenous 
limitations and their exogenous environment. This is that, because of the 
circumstances in which people from lower SEP groups live, the negative effects of 
bounded rationality are exaggerated. For instance, poorer members of society will 
more often have to make decisions which require volition. This draws on their finite 
psychological resources, so that earlier acts to maintain willpower for healthy 
decisions will have detrimental impacts on later attempts at volition. This decision 
fatigue is more common in lower SEP groups.145 
 
The third reason relates to the consumer’s exogenous environment. Following the 
idea that rationality (or the lack of it) is not the sole determinant of consumer 
behaviour, the consumer’s environment can result in purchasing decisions which are 
not in the consumer’s best health interests. So, for instance, consumers may not be 
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able to follow through with healthful decisions if their poverty means that purchasing 
is restricted by cost.146 
 
These ideas are compounded by the two inherent assumptions of the EU information 
paradigm – that information is both sufficient and accurate – as these are not 
designed with lower SEP groups in mind. 
 
IV. Policy opportunities 
 
In light of the difficulties discussed in this paper, behavioural insights have been 
steadily increasing in prominence in law, but have yet to achieve mainstream 
acceptance into policy-making.147 As Jolls and Sunstein note: 
 
To the extent that legal rules are designed on the basis of their anticipated 
effects on behavio[u]r, bounded rationality is obviously relevant to the 
formulation of legal policy. But an important and under-addressed question is 
precisely how it is relevant to the formulation of legal policy. The most obvious 
possibility is that, given a demonstration of the existence and importance of a 
particular aspect of bounded rationality, the law should be structured to 
presume the persistence of that particular feature of human behaviour.148 
 
However, while ‘laws fail because of a failure of the behavioural models on which 
they are based’,149 findings from behavioural research do not necessarily provide a 
ready solution for more capable policy. Nevertheless, the implications of not taking a 
lead from behavioural insights are too great to ignore.150 
 
The remainder of this section, therefore, seeks to synthesise when behaviourally-
informed interventions are warranted, what types of interventions are desirable, and 
how these can be incorporated into consumer policy. 
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Behaviourally-informed policies are often dismissed for three reasons. Critics claim, 
firstly, that these policies are paternalistic and infringe consumers’ personal 
autonomy, but the issue of paternalism has been explored at great length in the 
literature. Secondly, some question the effectiveness of behavioural findings, but 
interventions should only be based on sufficient and best available evidence, with a 
thorough analysis of the foreseen implications, unintended consequences and the 
balancing of all other options. Thirdly, others highlight the multifactorial nature of 
NCDs.151 The multifactorial nature of NCDs is also openly accepted. However, 
behavioural insights are not peddled as a magic bullet. ‘Instead, behavioural 
economics can perhaps best be thought of as offering a library of tools, not all of 
which can be used at any specific time, but each of which may be of use in some 
particular contexts. Behavioural economics is not a panacea, but by using the 
insights from human psychology that are embedded in the approach, academics and 
policy makers may be able to design interventions that – in some circumstances – 
are relatively well equipped to motivate people to behave in ways that are better for 
themselves, and for society at large.’152  
 
Moreover, the aim of behavioural policies is not to change the law entirely, or to 
make out that behavioural interventions are without difficulties.153 It is to find a 
balance between preventing NCDs and reducing health inequalities, while still 
promoting the functioning of the internal market taking a high level of consumer 
protection.154 Consumer law should adopt laws which not only take into account the 
behaviour of consumers generally but which place greater emphasis on the 
behaviour of members of lower SEP groups in line with the principle of proportionate 
universalism.  
 
When developing NCD prevention policies there are five pertinent questions. Firstly, 
do consumers suffer from systematic misperceptions about the product or the 
practice? Secondly, do sellers respond strategically to this misperception? Thirdly, 
does this consumer misperception increase the likelihood of developing NCDs or 
increasing health inequalities? Fourthly, is legal intervention warranted and, if so, 
what type of legal intervention is desirable?155 The overriding consideration for each 
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of these cases should be the degree to which members of lower SES groups are 
affected.156 
 
There has been much research in recent years on the actual157 and potential158 
success of behavioural research in NCD prevention. The findings are often conflicting 
or context-specific. It is therefore not always easy to incorporate findings into 
policy.159 Indeed, the evidence on behavioural approaches to a reduction in health 
inequalities, especially in differing SEP groups, is even less explored. Nevertheless, 
even based on current research, there is sufficient evidence that behavioural 
interventions work.160 With future experimentation, and with commissioning of 
research on this, the EU would be in a position to determine the effectiveness of 
specific behavioural policies. Indeed, many policies are well research and already 
known to the Commission, including nutrient profiling, front of pack nutritional 
labelling and standardised tobacco packaging. Moreover, where research suggests 
that information regulation is failing to provide effective solutions, this must be 
accepted, and other interventions in the regulatory toolbox adopted. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
‘Non-communicable diseases can be prevented and their impacts significantly 
reduced, with millions of lives saved and untold suffering avoided.’161 There is no 
easy way to achieve this most necessary of aims. It demands action and cooperation 
from all levels and sectors of society. However, the EU’s current failures in consumer 
protection can be said to originate to a significant degree from a reliance on the 
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information paradigm with its assumption of rational actors. The EU desperately 
needs to re-evaluate its laws in light of increasingly strong evidence which makes 
clear that consumers have limitations of the mind, interact with their environment, 
and face external obstacles. 
 
Individual policies require specific research to ensure that they are based on the best 
available evidence with minimal chance of unintended consequences. With more 
attention given to behavioural research, and the calls for more research, the EU can 
develop a sound understanding of how specific policies can incorporate behavioural 
insights for NCD prevention and health inequalities reduction. 
 
What is needed is an integrated approach which recognises the reduction of health 
inequalities as a prime consideration. To achieve this, firstly, behavioural insights, 
especially those from consumers in low SEP groups, need to be integrated into 
mainstream consumer policy at every stage of development. Secondly, where 
behavioural research reveals that the information paradigm is unlikely to lead 
consumers to make healthier behavioural decisions, other tools in the regulatory 
toolbox, such as marketing restrictions, need to be deployed. 
